Friday, May 29, 2009
Recession: What Does It Mean To Investors?
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Bond Yield Curve And The Stock Market
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Saturday, May 9, 2009
"Three Choices that Make You Who You Are" and why they matter.
Sunday, May 3, 2009
BYD: Positioning Berkshire Hathaway for the “Chinese Century”
Warren Buffett is a margin of safety investor. That is, Buffet purchases equity stakes in companies only when he is more or less certain that he won’t permanently lose his capital and where the price is such that he believes he will earn an outstanding return on his investment over time. In order to practice this risk averse method of investing, Buffett has often had to pass on investment opportunities where it was not clear to him how the competitive dynamics of the relevant industry would change over time
Monday, April 27, 2009
Market Cycles and Self-fulfilling Prophecies
Friday, April 24, 2009
Companies with the Biggest Earnings and Losses (2008)
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Focus still on America to lead global recovery
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Big Bank Profits Are Bogus! It’s A Massive Public Deception!
Citibank (C: 2.65 -0.29 -9.86%) is the nation’s third largest, with assets of $1.2 trillion in its main banking unit. Its total credit exposure to derivatives is a bit lower than Morgan’s, at 278 percent, but still extremely high. Plus, it has other troubles, especially the surging default rates in its sprawling global portfolio of credit cards and other consumer loans. (More on these in a moment.)
Wells Fargo and Wachovia now make up the nation’s fourth largest bank with combined assets of $1.17 trillion. But in the fourth quarter, they still reported separately, which is illuminating: Even without Wachovia’s troubled assets, TheStreet.com Ratings has downgraded Wells Fargo to a D+. Wachovia, meanwhile, got a D. This tells you that Wells Fargo wasn’t exactly the best merger partner, unless you believe in some bizarre math wherein adding two negatives somehow gives you a positive result. SunTrust (STI: 13.80 -0.91 -6.19%), with $185 billion in assets, is getting hit hard by the collapse in the commercial real estate. Its Financial Strength Rating is D+. HSBC Bank USA (HBC: 32.09 -1.36 -4.07%) has massive credit exposure to derivatives that’s even greater than Morgan’s: 550 percent of risk-based capital. We’re not looking at its larger foreign operations. But the U.S. numbers are ugly enough, meriting a rating of D+. Goldman Sachs (GS: 115.01 0.00 0.00%), which reported for the first time as a commercial bank in the fourth quarter, seems to be taking the biggest risks of all in derivatives. Its total credit exposure is 1,056 percent of capital. Bottom line: It debuts as a bank with a rating of D, on par with Wachovia. Regional banks: Banking regulators have been largely mute regarding major regional banks. But several are also at risk of failure, including Compass Bank (Alabama), Fifth Third (Michigan), Huntington (Ohio), and E*Trade Bank (Virginia). Primary reason: Massive losses in commercial real estate loans. Smaller banks: On its “Problem List,” the FDIC reports only 252 institutions with assets of $159 billion. In contrast, our list of at-risk institutions includes 1,816 banks and thrifts with $4.67 trillion in assets. That’s seven times the number of institutions and 29 times more assets at risk than the FDIC admits. What Explains the Huge Gap Between Official Declarations and Our Analysis? We all use essentially the same data. And conceptually, the analytical approach is also similar. The primary difference is that the regulators have an agenda: Instead of protecting the people from bank failures, they’re trying harder than ever to protect failed banks from the people. Specifically … They have forever hidden the names of the banks on the FDIC’s “Problem List,” making it almost impossible for average consumers to get prior warnings of troubles. They have never disclosed their own official ratings of the banks - the CAMELS ratings - making it difficult for the public to find safe institutions they can trust. They have religiously underestimated - or understated - the depth and breadth of the debt crisis. And as I explained a moment ago, they have rigged their recent stress tests to give passing grades to all of the nation’s 14 largest banks, sending the false signal that even the most dangerous among them are somehow “safe.” Legal Cover-Ups, Flim-Flam and Sham In the Big Bank’s “Glowing” First-Quarter Earnings Reports Wall Street is aglow with the latest “better-than-expected” earnings reports by major banks. But take one look below the surface, and you’ll see three of the most egregious accounting gimmicks in recent history. Gimmick #1. Toxic asset cover-up. In their infinite wisdom, global banking regulators have now agreed to let banks cover up their toxic assets by booking them at fluffy-high values, bearing little resemblance to actual market prices. Like magic, the bad assets are suddenly worth more, as hundreds of billions in losses are defined away. Gimmick #2. Reserve flim-flam. Every quarter, banks are required to estimate their losses and decide how much to set aside in loss reserves. If they deliberately guess too much in one quarter and too little in the next, they can shove all their bad earnings into earlier P&Ls and make future P&Ls look rosy by comparison. Gimmick #3. The great debt sham. Consider this scenario: A financially distressed real estate developer owes the bank $4 million. His revenues have plunged. He’s lost a fortune in his properties. And he’s on the brink of bankruptcy. Therefore, in the secondary market, traders recognize that loans like his are worth, say, only half their face value, or about $2 million. So far, a very common situation, right? But now imagine this: He walks into the bank one morning and claims that he really owes only $2 million. Why? Because, in theory, he says, he could buy back his own loan for that price, thereby reducing his debt in half. In practice, of course, that’s a pipedream. If he actually had the cash to buy back his own loans on the market, then he wouldn’t be financially distressed in the first place. And if he weren’t financially distressed, his loans wouldn’t be selling on the market for half price. The reality is that he can’t buy back his own debt and never will. And even if he could someday, he will still be on the hook for the full $4 million unless and until he files for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy judge decides otherwise. That’s why the government would never let real estate developers - or hardly anyone else, for that matter - mark down the debts on their books and still stay in business. But guess what? The government lets banks do precisely that! It’s the ultimate double standard: The banks get away with inflating their toxic assets. But at the same time, they’re allowed to mark to market their own debts, which happen to be trading at huge discounts on the open market precisely because of their toxic assets.
Accountants call it a “credit value adjustment.” I call it cheating. Finding all of this hard to believe? Then consider … How Citigroup Mobilized ALL THREE of These Gimmicks to Create One of the Greatest Accounting Shams of All Time in Its First-Quarter Earnings Report I’m outraged. But I’m glad to see that someone besides us is speaking out: Meredith Whitney, one of the few no-nonsense analysts in the industry, says that the banks’ latest reports are, in essence, “a great whitewash.” Jack T. Ciesielski, publisher of an accounting advisory service, calls it “junk income.” And Saturday’s New York Times, picking up from their research, lays out precisely how Citigroup has transformed a massive loss into what appears to be a fat profit … First, Citigroup deployed the Toxic Asset Cover-Up. By inflating the value of the bad assets on its books, it was able to beef up its after-tax profits by $413 million. Second, Citigroup used the Reserve Flim-Flam gimmick: By (a) shoving most of its bad-debt losses into last year’s fourth quarter and (b) greatly understating its likely losses in the first quarter, the bank legally rigged its books to look like it had made major improvements. Even assuming no further deterioration in its loan portfolio, I estimate this gimmick alone bloated profits by at least another $1 billion. Third, Citigroup went all out with the Great Debt Sham, marking down its own debt and creating an additional $2.7 billion in purely bogus profits from this maneuver alone. So here’s Citigroup’s true math for the first quarter: So-called “profit” $1.6 billion Gimmick #1 $0.4 billion Gimmick #2 $1.0 billion Gimmick #3 $2.7 billion Total gimmicks $4.1 billion Actual result: $2.5 billion LOSS! And all this despite the fact that Citigroup’s loan portfolios actually deteriorated further in the first quarter. Based on its Q1 2009 Quarterly Financial Data Supplement, we find that: Net credit losses in Citi’s global credit card business surged from $1.67 billion at year-end 2008 to $1.94 billion by March 31. And compared to March 2008, they surged by a whopping 56 percent! (Page 9 of its data supplement.) Foretelling future credit card losses, the delinquency rate (90+ days past due) on those credit cards jumped from 2.62 percent at year-end to 3.16 percent on March 31 (page 10). Credit losses on consumer banking operations jumped from $3.442 billion on December 31 to $3.786 billion on March 31. And compared to the year-earlier period, they surged 66 percent (page 12). By almost every measure, Citigroup’s first-quarter numbers are worse than they were just three months earlier and far worse than they were 12 months before. My forecast: Citigroup’s effort last week to twist this into an “improvement” will go down in history as one of the greatest banking deceptions of all time. But Citigroup is not the only one. Nearly all other major banks are suffering similar surges in their credit losses and delinquency rates. Nearly all are using at least one of the same gimmicks to bloat their first-quarter profits. And every single one is destined to see massive new losses, driving their shares to new lows and the banking system as a whole into a far more severe crisis. Bottom line: Rather than the private-public partnership the government has called for to address the nation’s banking woes, we see little more than private-public collusion to hide the truth from the public, paper over the problems and, ultimately, sink the banks into an even deeper hole. My Recommendations In my book, The Ultimate Depression Survival Guide, I give you very detailed, step-by-step instructions on what to do immediately. Here’s a quick summary: Step 1. Get away from risky stocks. Use the recent stock market rally as a selling opportunity - your second chance to get out of danger before it’s too late. Step 2. Get out of sinking real estate. If there’s a temporary improvement in the market, grab it to sell the properties you’ve been wanting to sell all along. Step 3. Raise as much cash as you possibly can - not only by selling stocks and real estate, but also by cutting expenses and selling other things you own. Step 4. Make sure you keep your cash in one of the safe banks on the list we provide on the book’s resource page. Or better yet, follow my instructions on how to buy Treasury bills. They’re safer than any bank, with no limit on the Treasury’s direct guarantee. Step 5. For assets you cannot sell, buy protection using exchange-traded funds that are designed to go UP when stocks fall. The more the market goes down, the more you make; and those profits can offset any losses you suffer in the stocks or real estate that you cannot sell. Step 6. Later, get ready for the big bottom in nearly all markets. That’s when you should be able to lock in relatively safe interest rates of 10 percent or more for years to come … buy shares in our country’s best companies for pennies on the dollar … buy a dream home in a great location that’s practically being given away. To avoid conflicts of interest, Weiss Research and its staff do not hold positions in companies recommended in MaM, nor do we accept any compensation for such recommendations. The comments, graphs, forecasts, and indices published in MaM are based upon data whose accuracy is deemed reliable but not guaranteed. Performance returns cited are derived from our best estimates but must be considered hypothetical in as much as we do not track the actual prices investors pay or receive.
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Is Copper Poised For A New Secular Bull Market Run? Probably Not
Of the six recessions since 1974, the current recession would be the only one that would see copper prices acting as a leading indicator. In fact, the most bullish price moves for copper occur late in the economic cycle not at the beginning. These bull markets in copper are noted by the maroon colored vertical lines.
Another explanation tossed about to explain copper’s rise is that the easy monetary policies of the Federal Reserve will lead to inflation, and copper is only anticipating these coming changes. While higher copper prices would be expected as inflation rises, the fact remains that there is a very poor correlation between higher copper prices and inflationary expectations. Of the 5 bull runs in copper since 1974, only 2 were associated with any real significant inflationary pressures, and these were in the 1970’s. This can be seen in figure 2 a monthly chart of copper; in the lower panel is the inflation rate as measured by a year over year change in the CPI. As before, the vertical gray lines note recessionary periods. Recessions by definition are deflationary, and we should not expect copper prices to rise during the current de-leveraging, deflationary environment.
Figure 2. Copper v. Inflation
So why is copper rising? Brent Cook at explorationinsights.com has written a very balanced commentary on copper. He states the following:
“What’s behind the current price increase?
Both China and South Korea have been adding to strategic reserves and restocking at what they consider to be much better prices. Copper producers and marketers all down the supply chain are keeping some supply out of the market due to low prices or a complete lack of buyers.
The desire by Asian buyers to turn US dollars into hard assets-a phenomenon we are seeing across the entire hard asset class.
Short covering as the copper price stabilized.
A favorable arbitrage between the London Metal Exchange (LME) and Shanghai Exchange that made it cheaper to import copper cathode into China.
Scrap supplies having dwindled due to the lack of credit, low prices and slowing manufacturing activity. With the exception of Asia’s desire to convert their substantial holdings of US dollars into something of value, I believe all the factors listed above are temporary. Going forward inflation may also play a role. “
If you note, none of Mr. Cook’s observations as to what is driving the price of copper have anything to do increasing copper consumption. In fact, he goes on to state that in all likelihood copper utilization will be down for 2009:
“To come to some sort of understanding of underlying fundamentals of the copper market we need to look at where copper actually goes. The retail and commercial construction markets use about 46% of all copper. Another 12% goes into vehicles. These two industries were trashed, to say the least, in 2008; they are not likely to do too well this year either. Without a global recovery in both industries to past levels I don’t see how copper consumption can possibly increase significantly. “
The serial bottom callers and those pointing to the magic, predictive powers of copper can always point to China. But haven’t we been down this road before? Wasn’t decoupling disproved in the summer of 2008? Yes, the Chinese economy might be the world’s economic engine, but they don’t live in isolation. According to Cook, global demand and Chinese consumption of copper will remain weak:
“Can China save the day?
Most copper imported into China is then reprocessed and extruded as copper wire. When the copper wire is manufactured into tubing, refrigerators and batteries for export it still shows up as internal Chinese copper consumption. There is no way of knowing how much of China’s copper consumption actually stays internal and how much goes back out in other export products. If China is going to save the day for copper we have to approach usage from the perspective of China’s total economy.
China’s GPD in 2007 and 2008 was approximately 6% of global GDP-Europe and USA account for nearly half of global GDP. Based on the most recent World Bank statistics, China’s 2007 total GDP was $3.3 trillion, a full 55% of which was attributable to exports. In 2008 China’s exports were down 28%. This year is not getting off to a roaring start as the Shanghai Daily reports that industrial output is down 12.7% for the first two months of 2009.
China’s building boom is not fairing very well either. Post Beijing Olympics, China’s real estate market has collapsed. According to Jack Rodman, a China real estate expert, in Beijing alone approximately 500 million square feet of commercial real estate was developed over the past few years; this is more than all the office space in Manhattan. Rodman estimates 20% of that now stands vacant.
Similar stories are being reported across Asia as documented by the Asia Property Report which estimates that real estate transactions were down 70% in Q-4, 2008. With Asia and the world’s building boom gone bust or at least slowed significantly, and China’s export markets in a severe and prolonged recession, demand for their products and the copper within is unlikely to recover soon. In the near term at least, increased copper consumption would require a global recovery approaching the levels of a few years ago.
Confirming the obvious: true internal Chinese consumption is much less than many analysts believe and is unlikely to take up the slack in global copper consumption. “
My Take
From a technical perspective I do not believe copper is in a bull market or even poised to enter into a new bull market. In addition and as explained above, I attach no significance to the price movements of copper as they relate to economic growth.
What we do know is this: 1) over 7 months copper dropped 70% from high to low; 2) over the last 4 months, copper has bounced 70%; 3) copper still stands 50% below its all time highs.
Figure 3 is a monthly chart of a continuous copper futures contract. The indicator in the lower channel is our “next big thing” indicator, and the purpose of this indicator is to identify those assets that have the potential for secular trend change.
Figure 3. Copper/ monthly
The first thing we notice is that copper bounced at support or the breakout point (labeled with a “1″) of the previous bull run. In other words, copper made a round tripper over the past 4 years. The bounce has carried 70% higher but right into the down sloping 10 month moving average. In other words, copper prices are behaving as they should. There was a breakout of historic proportions. Why did this breakout lead to such monstrous gains in 2005 and 2006? Because the breakout of historic proportions was 12 years in the making. In other words, the breakout was from a 12 year trading range. The current 70% move has the makings of a snapback or countertrend rally.
So the question I want to answer is this: Is copper poised for a new sustainable, secular bull market run?
Based upon the “next big thing” indicator, the answer is no. Based upon the technical setup, the answer is no. Going back to the 1970’s, every major move in copper was heralded by the “next big thing” indicator signaling the possibility of a secular trend change. Even though copper has moved 70% off its low, I attach no significance to such a move. From my technical perspective, this is a bounce off of support and into resistance. Copper will need more sideways action and time before another new bull market is launched.
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